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State v. Davis: Peremptory Strikes and Religion-The 
Unworkable Peremptory Challenge Jurisprudence* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Davis1 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a 
religiously motivated peremptory challenge was not a violation of the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, it 
failed to extend the United States Supreme Court's recent peremptory 
challenge jurisprudence, which has consistently extended defendants' and 
jurors' equal protection rights, to its next logical step.2 
This note will argue that the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in its 
analysis by refusing to apply the Supreme Court's logic to religiously 
motivated peremptory challenges. In Parts II and III this note will 
discuss the background and facts of the Davis decision. Part IV will 
explain the method the Minnesota Supreme Court used in deciding the 
case. Part V will discuss problems with the Minnesota Supreme Court's 
reasoning in not extending the Batson v. Kentuckyl prohibition against 
racially based peremptory challenges to religiously based challenges. 
Additionally, Part V will argue that, although the Minnesota Supreme 
Court erred when it refused to prohibit religiously motivated challenges, 
the United States Supreme Court peremptory challenge jurisprudence is 
* Copyright <e> 1995 by D. Scott Crook. 
1. 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993). 
2. The Supreme Court has slowly increased the scope of the equal protection clause 
over jury selection procedures. See generally Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) 
(holding that the equal protection clause precludes state from limiting juror selection pool to 
white males only); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (holding that the equal protection 
clause protects defendant if the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenge persistent! y to 
exclude jurors of the defendant's race from previous juries); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
( 1986) (holding that the equal protection clause allows defendant to establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination based on suspect peremptory challenges by prosecution in defendant's voir 
dire only); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that the equal protection clause 
allows defendant to assert juror's equal protection rights when prosecutor's peremptory strikes 
are suspect even if the defendant and juror are of a different race); Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that the equal protection clause protects juror's 
and litigant's equal protection rights in civil cases because attorneys are state actors); Georgia 
v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (holding that the equal protection clause precludes 
defense attorneys from making race based peremptory strikes); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 
1419 (1994) (holding that the equal protection clause precludes gender-based peremptory 
challenges). 
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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illogical and unmanageable. This note contends that a return to the stan-
dards established in Batson would bring more legitimacy and 
manageability to the Court's peremptory challenge jurisprudence and 
would have allowed the Minnesota Supreme Court to reach the same 
result it reached in Davis without making unreasonable conclusions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court first applied equal protection to jury selection 
procedures in Strauder v. West Virginia. 4 Strauder was a black man who 
had been indicted for murder. 5 The state statute defining the jury 
selection pool precluded black men from being selected as jury mem-
bers. 6 Strauder argued that this preclusion violated his equal protection 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The Supreme Court agreed 
and held "that the statute ... discriminat[ed] in the selection of jurors 
... against negroes because of their color, [which] amount[ed] to a 
denial of the equal protection of the laws to a colored man when he is put 
upon trial. "8 
Almost one hundred years later, the issue of whether race based 
peremptory challenges constituted a violation of the equal protection 
clause reached the Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama. 9 The Swain 
case involved a black defendant who had been indicted for robbery. 10 
During the voir dire, the prosecutor exercised his peremptory strikes 
against all of the black jurors in the jury pool. 11 Swain claimed that the 
peremptory challenges constituted discrimination in the jury selection 
process and that this discrimination violated his equal protection rights. 12 
The Court held against the defendant but concluded that if "a prosecutor, 
... in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime, 
and whoever the defendant or victim may be, is responsible for the 
removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors, "13 his 
behavior creates a presumption that the peremptory challenges violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 14 
4. 100 u.s. 303 (1879). 
5. ld. at 304. 
6. I d. 
7. I d. 
8. ld. at310. 
9. 380 u.s. 202 (1965). 
10. ld. at 203. 
11. ld. at 210. 
12. I d. 
13. ld. at 223. 
14. ld. at 224. 
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In Batson v. Kentucky, Is the Court revisited the peremptory 
challenge issue. Batson, a black man, had been indicted for robbery and 
receipt of stolen goods. 16 During the course of the voir dire, the 
prosecutor excused all four remaining black jurors with peremptory 
challenges. Batson contended that his Fourteenth Amendment right to 
equal protection had been violated. 17 The court held that a defendant 
could establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the peremptory 
challenge context by establishing that he or she "is a member of a 
cognizable racial group, and [that] the prosecutor has exercised perempto-
ry challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's 
race. "18 Further, the defendant should realize that the peremptory 
challenge allows people who wish to discriminate the opportunity to do 
so. 19 Additionally, the Court required that "the defendant must show 
that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference 
that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen . . . on 
account of . . . race. "20 The Court then held that "the burden shifts to 
the State to come forward with a neutral explanation"21 for the peremp-
tory challenge. The Court's decision tempered the more stringent Swain 
requirement that the defendant prove a consistent historical pattern of 
prosecutorial discrimination in peremptory challenges. 
The Court continued to broaden the rights of the defendant to 
challenge race based peremptory challenges in Powers v. Ohio. 22 
Powers, a white man indicted for murder, challenged the prosecutor's six 
peremptory strikes that excluded all black venirepersons from the jury.23 
The Supreme Court held that the jurors' equal protection rights had been 
violated24 and that the defendant had standing to sue on behalf of the 
juror.zs 
While the previous cases were all criminal cases, in Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co. , 26 the Court extended the prohibition against race 
based peremptory challenges to civil litigants. Edmonson was a black 
litigant suing Leesville Concrete for negligence relating to a job-site 
15. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
16. /d. at 82. 
17. /d. at 83. 
18. /d. at 96 (citation omitted). 
19. /d. (citing Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). 
20. /d. 
21. /d. at 97. 
22. 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
23. /d. at 403. 
24. /d. at 409. 
25. /d. at 415. 
26. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
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accident. 27 The defendant used two of its peremptory challenges to 
excuse black jurors.28 In response to Edmonson's appeal, the Supreme 
Court extended the equal protection analysis to civil litigants because they 
were state actors when they exercised their peremptory challenges. 29 
Finally, the Court extended the race neutrality requirement in 
peremptory challenges, which previously had applied only to the 
prosecution in criminal cases, to criminal defendants in Georgia v. 
McCollum. 30 This case involved two white defendants who were 
indicted for aggravated assault and simple battery against two black 
VICtims. The State filed a motion to prohibit them from exercising 
peremptory challenges in a racially biased manner. 31 The trial court 
denied the motion because "[n]either Georgia nor federal law prohibit[ed] 
criminal defendants from exercising peremptory" challenges.32 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court held that, because the defendants were state 
actors when exercising peremptory challenges, they, like the state, could 
not exercise their challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. 33 
III. FAcrs IN STATE V. DAVIS 
Although the race based peremptory challenge had a long history of 
exclusion prior to State v. Davis,34 the question of whether religiously 
based peremptory challenges were improper had not been answered. The 
defendant, Edward Lee Davis, was an African-American who was 
charged with aggravated robbery. 35 During jury selection, no jurors 
were challenged for cause, but the prosecutor used one of her three 
peremptory challenges to excuse a black man from the panel.36 The 
defendant objected to the peremptory strike and asked for a race neutral 
explanation. 37 The prosecutor explained that she had excused the juror 
not because of the juror's race but because the juror was a Jehovah's 
27. /d. at 616. 
28. /d. 
29. /d. at 630. 
30. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). 
31. /d. at 2350. 
32. /d. at 2352. 
33. ld. at 2359. The Supreme Court has decided J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 
(1994), which held that gender based peremptory challenges are also unconstitutional. 
Although the United States Supreme Court decision has relevance to the decision that this note 
addresses, it does not form part of the background to the decision in this case because it was 
decided after the Davis decision. 
34. 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993). 
35. ld. at 768. 
36. /d. 
37. /d. 
309] STATE V. DAVIS 313 
Witness. 38 The trial judge ruled that the peremptory strike would stand 
because the prosecutor had given a race neutral explanation. 39 Davis 
was convicted of the charges. 40 
Davis appealed the conviction to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 
claiming that the trial court had abused its discretion by allowing a 
religiously discriminatory peremptory challenge. 41 The appellate court 
upheld the trial court's decision, and Davis appealed to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court.42 
IV. REASONING 
Justice Simonett writing for the Minnesota Supreme Court began the 
majority's analysis by arguing that Batson is only a limited exception to 
the Swain decision. 43 He argued that the Batson holding was necessitat-
ed by the "serious and well-documented" abuse of the peremptory 
challenge by prosecutors to exclude racial minorities from the jury.44 
Because Justice Simonett believed that the peremptory challenge had not 
been used "common[ly] and flagrant[ly]" against religious groups, he 
refused to extend the Batson decision to include religiously based 
peremptory challenges.45 He further argued that religiously motivated 
peremptory challenges are more legitimate than race based challenges 
since the reasons for the challenge are grounded in a juror's particular 
beliefs which could affect how he or she would decide a case.46 
Finally, since "religious affiliation ... is not as self-evident as race or 
38. The prosecutor explained that "it was highly significant to the state ... that the man 
was a Jahovah [sic] Witness .... I would never, if I had a preemptory [sic] challenge left, 
strike[-] or fail to strike a Jahovah [sic] Witness from my jury." ld. 
39. ld. 
40. Statev. Davis, No. C7-92-1037, 1993 WL 593, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1993) 
(unpublished opinion). 
I d. 
41. ld. 
42. Jd. 
43. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 768. 
44. Jd. at 770. 
45. Jd. at 771. 
46. The court explained: 
Yet when religious beliefs translate into judgments on the merits of the cause to be 
judged, it is difficult to distinguish, in challenging a juror, between an impermissible 
bias on the basis of religious affiliation and a permissible religion-neutral explanation. 
In the case before us, for example, would the explanation that the juror was "reluctant 
to exercise authority over their fellow human beings" be sufficient to a prima facie 
case of religious bias? A juror's religious beliefs are inviolate, but when they are the 
basis for a person's moral values and produce societal views ... it would not seem 
that a peremptory strike based on these societal views should be attributed to a 
pernicious religious bias. 
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gender," the court contended that disallowing religiously neutral 
peremptory challenges would become too complicated to administer.47 
The court also recognized that the Powers decision, which gave the 
litigant standing to sue on behalf of the juror, was based on two 
significant policy considerations: first, racially biased peremptory 
challenges promote "cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its 
obligation to adhere to the law;"48 second, a juror excluded because of 
race "suffer[s] a profound humiliation. "49 The court conceded that these 
two considerations logically lead to the extension of Batson's prohibition 
against racially motivated challenges to include religiously motivated 
peremptory challenges. so However, relying on its conclusion that 
religiously based challenges were not used "purposefully to perpetrate 
religious bigotry"51 and on its understanding of the history of perempto-
ry challenges, 52 the court refused to apply these considerations to the 
Davis case. 53 
The dissenting opinion by Justice Wahl argued that dicta issued in 
several previous Supreme Court opinions supported an extension of 
Batson to purposeful religious discrimination in peremptory challenges. 54 
Justice Page joined Justice Wahl's dissent, and, in addition, argued that 
Minnesota Statute section 593.32 would preclude a religiously motivated 
peremptory strike. ss 
47. ld. 
48. ld. at 769 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991)). 
49. ld. 
50. ld. at 769. 
51. ld. at 769-70. 
52. ld. at 770. 
53. The court stated: 
If the life of the law were logic rather than experience, Batson might well be 
extended to include religious bias and, for that matter, an endless number of other 
biases. The question, however, is whether the peremptory strike has been 
purposefully employed to perpetrate rei igious bigotry to the extent that the institutional 
integrity of the jury has been impaired, and thus requiring further modification of the 
traditional peremptory challenge. 
!d. at 769-70. 
54. ld. at 773. She argues that the opinions in Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 
(1991), and Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976), support the conclusion that religiously 
motivated peremptory challenges should be suspect under the Batson rule. Davis, 504 N. W.2d 
at 773 (Wahl, J., dissenting). 
55. ld. at 774. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Minnesota Supreme Court Erred by not Requiring a 
Religiously Neutral Explanation for the Peremptory Challenge 
315 
When the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to require a religiously 
neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge by the prosecutor in this 
case, it incorrectly analyzed Swain and Batson and failed to apply the 
precedent of the United States Supreme Court. First, the court mis-
characterized the Batson decision. Second, the court misanalyzed the 
Batson decision's historical analysis of the peremptory challenge. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court mischaracterized Batson when it 
claimed that the decision was only a "limited exception" to Swain and, 
therefore, must be analyzed in light of the Swain decision. 56 The 
contention that Batson is only a "limited exception" to Swain is incorrect; 
Batson actually overruled the Swain decision. 57 
Even if the court's characterization were correct, its assumptions 
about religiously based peremptory challenges were flawed. It claimed 
that religiously based peremptory challenges were not as common as race 
based peremptory challenges were before the Batson decision. In a 
footnote, the court cited cases in which other courts found that religiously 
motivated reasons constituted a sufficiently race neutral explanation to 
overcome a Batson challenge. 58 
The court explained that these cases demonstrated that religiously 
based peremptory challenges had been upheld by other courts. The first 
case was United States v. Clemmons. 59 It involved a man convicted of 
selling stolen treasury bonds. The man claimed that the prosecution's 
exclusion of Balhadra Das, a minority juror who appeared to be black (al-
though he probably was Asian-Indian), was suspect and demanded a race 
neutral explanation. 60 The prosecution explained that he struck the juror 
because he was "Hindu in religion. " 61 The court upheld the prose-
cution's challenge because the religious reason given was a race neutral 
56. /d. at 768. 
57. The United States Supreme Court stated in reference to Batson, "Relying upon the 
Equal Protection alone, we overruled Swain to the extent it foreclosed objections to the discrim-
inatory use of peremptories in the course of a specific trial." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 
405 (1991). See also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2352 (1992) ("In Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986), the Court discarded Swain's evidentiary formulation."). 
58. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771 n.3 ("There is authority that the religious beliefs of a 
juror may provide a race-neutral reason for a Batson challenge."). 
59. 892 F.2d 1153, 1154 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990). 
60. /d. at 1155-56. 
61. /d. at 1156. 
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explanation.62 The other case the court cited, People v. Malone, 63 
involved a defendant who was convicted of armed robbery. Three black 
jurors were challenged by the prosecutor. 64 When the defendant 
demanded a race neutral explanation, the prosecutor explained that he 
excused one of the jurors because of "her religious convictions. "65 
Again the court that heard the case upheld the challenge. 66 
Although the court undoubtedly cited these cases to support its 
decision not to extend the Batson case, the cases indicate that striking a 
juror because of religion is not an uncommon occurrence. 67 In fact, by 
requiring race neutral explanations from prosecutors, the Batson case has 
drawn attention to many religiously (not to mention gender) motivated 
challenges. The Minnesota Supreme Court's own footnote severely 
undermines its contention that religiously based peremptory challenges 
are not a general problem in the peremptory challenge system. 
The court also misanalyzed the Batson decision when it claimed that 
the history of the peremptory challenge required the court to continue 
allowing religiously based peremptory challenges. 68 The court argued 
that since the randomness of the jury pool seems unfair, the peremptory 
challenge system served to alleviate the jury pool's arbitrariness and ease 
the minds of the litigants. 69 It further argued that because race based 
peremptory challenges were so prevalent, they undermined the integrity 
of the peremptory challenge and cast doubt on its fairness. 70 For that 
reason, the court felt that the restrictions on peremptory challenges were 
properly limited in cases involving racially motivated challenges. The 
Davis court further argued that since religious discrimination in jury 
selection was not as prevalent, it did not damage the jury system's 
credibility and, therefore, the religiously based peremptory challenge 
need not be limited. 71 
62. /d. at 1157. 
63. 570 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 135 (Ill. 1991). 
64. /d. at 588. 
65. /d. 
66. /d. 
67. Another case involving a religious explanation given as a race neutral ground for 
exclusion of a juror was Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The case 
involved a defendant convicted of burglary. /d. During the selection of the jury, four black 
venireperson were excused by the prosecution. One of the challenged jurors was excluded 
because he was a member of the Church of Christ which the prosecutor thought was "a little 
bit away from the main stream." /d. at 442. Another excluded juror was challenged because 
she was a Jehovalt's Witness. /d. 
68. See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. 1993). 
69. /d. 
70. /d. 
71. /d. at 771. 
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However, in finding against the defendant, the court emphasized the 
widespread abuse of the race based peremptory challenges as its principal 
vice72 but largely ignored the real vice of race based peremptory 
challenges: these challenges are unfair per se. Using them casts doubt 
on the peremptory challenge as a device to alleviate the jury pool's 
unfairness and to ease the minds of litigants. 73 However, the perception 
of unfairness applies equally to both religious based and race based 
peremptory challenges whether or not religious based peremptory 
challenges are used as frequently as race based challenges were. Just as 
it does when an exclusion is based on race, the idea that a person may be 
excused from jury service based on his or her religion casts a shadow of 
unfairness on the jury process rather than building its esteem in the eyes 
of the litigants and of the community. 74 However, the court contended 
that religion is a more permissible ground for juror exclusion than race 
because it forms the basis of personal beliefs that might legitimately lead 
to exclusion from a jury. 75 This contention suggests that all members 
of a particular religion think the same way on all issues. However, to 
contend that all people of the same religion have identical beliefs and 
therefore are unable to serve as impartial jurors and should be excluded 
is to "accept as a defense to ... discrimination the very stereotype the 
law condemns. "76 
Clearly, the Minnesota Supreme Court erred when it claimed that 
Batson was a limited exception to Swain which should not be extended 
to religiously based peremptory challenges. The question still remains 
however whether the Batson decision should be applied in Davis. 
Although the Batson decision did mention the violation of the juror's 
equal protection rights, 77 it only held that a defendant would have a 
legitimate claim if the claim were based on the prosecution's violation of 
the defendant's equal protection right, not the juror's.78 
72. See id. at 770-71. 
73. See id. Noticeably absent from the Minnesota Supreme Court's analysis is any 
mention of the unfairness of the race based peremptory challenge. The analysis focuses instead 
on its prevalence. 
74. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 
S. Ct. 2348 (1991); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-4 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
75. See Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771. 
76. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991). 
77. The Court stated, "As long as Strauder, therefore, the Court recognized that by 
denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the State unconstitution-
ally discriminated against the excluded juror." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). 
78. See id. at 96. 
318 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 9 
The Court did not decide that a defendant could assert a juror's equal 
protection rights until the Powers decision. 79 The Court in Powers 
declared that racial discrimination '"casts doubt on the integrity' ... and 
fairness of a criminal proceeding" because the jury selection process was 
intended to act as a "vital check" on the power of the state to discrimi-
nate. 80 The Court first argued that if discrimination is allowed in the 
jury selection process, the public perceives that the process is unfair. 81 
In the context of jury selection it is difficult to see how religious discrimi-
nation would be viewed by the public any differently then racial discrim-
ination. 82 Both types of discrimination seem to be intolerable to most 
Americans, 83 and both types of discrimination are prohibited by the 
Constitution. 84 
The second argument of the Court in Powers was that the juror who 
is excluded "because of race suffers a profound personal humiliation 
heightened by its public character. "85 Again, the Davis opinion is 
unclear about why a juror who is dismissed because of his or her religion 
would not suffer the same public humiliation that the Court describes in 
the context of racially motivated peremptory challenges. 86 
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court in Davis conceded that 
logically, it should apply the analysis of Powers to religiously motivated 
peremptory challenges, 87 it still refused to do so based on its contention 
that religiously based peremptory challenges were not as prevalent as race 
motivated peremptories. Since this belief in the "limited" nature of 
Batson was wrong, Powers must be applied. Consequently, the court 
should have extended the requirements of Powers to religiously motivated 
challenges because the exclusion of people from a jury based on religion 
79. Powers, 499 U.S. at 415 ("We conclude that a defendant in a criminal case can raise 
the third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the jury because of race."). 
80. ld. at 401. 
81. ld. 
82. See id. at 425 (Scalia, J., dissenting); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 773 (Minn. 
1993) (Walt!, J., dissenting); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury 
Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 765 (1992). 
83. America's long history of protecting against state involvement in religious affairs 
seems to support this. 
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
85. Powers, 499 U.S. at 413-14. 
86. The Court never explained in Powers what causes the humiliation, or if the 
humiliation only extends to those who have been dismissed because of race. See id. at 413. 
The Court's extension of protection to sex-based discrimination seems to indicate that the 
humiliation caused by exclusion is not limited only to race based challenges. See J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994). 
87. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. 1993). 
309] STATE V. DAVIS 319 
causes public cynicism about the jury system and personal humiliation to 
the excluded juror, just as it does for exclusions based on race. 
B. Requirement of Religiously Neutral Peremptory Challenges 
Demonstrates the Illegitimacy ofBatson's Progeny 
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court in Davis did not follow the 
logic of the Powers decision, the Powers decision requires an extension 
of the prohibition against racially discriminatory peremptory challenges 
to religiously discriminatory challenges. 88 This natural and logical 
extension of the recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence 
demonstrates the illegitimacy of the decisions: first, because the 
jurisprudence conflicts with the purpose of the peremptory challenge; and 
second, because the focus on the violation of the juror's equal protection 
rights is a departure from sound logic and is administratively burden-
some. 
1. Purpose of the peremptory challenge 
Peremptory challenges have existed for a long time. 89 The English 
common law recognized the right of the defense and the prosecution to 
challenge jurors without any cause.90 The United States, deriving the 
practice from England, 91 also recognized the right to peremptory 
challenges early in its history. 92 Although there is no Constitutional 
guarantee to a peremptory challenge, "the challenge is 'one of the most 
important of the rights secured to the accused. "'93 
The peremptory challenge, unlike challenges for cause, is exercised 
"without a reason stated. "94 It allows litigants to eliminate jurors based 
on "sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices"95 that have arisen 
because of "[their] limited knowledge of [the jurors]. "96 These sudden 
impressions may be based on group affiliation. 97 The purpose of the 
challenge is to allow the litigants the opportunity to "eliminate extremes 
of partiality" and to select jurors who will decide the case "on the basis 
88. See supra part V.A. 
89. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-18 (1965). 
90. /d. at 213. 
91. /d. at 214. 
92. /d. 
93. /d. at 218 (quoting Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)). 
94. /d. at 220; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 633 (1991) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
95. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892). 
96. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221. 
97. See id. 
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of evidence placed before them. "98 By allowing the litigant to challenge 
those whom he or she fears will be unfair, the court system "fosters both 
the perception and reality of an impartial jury. "99 
2. Focus of equal protection analysis should be on the litigant 
Adhering to the historical purpose of the peremptory challenge, the 
United States Supreme Court in its early decisions focused on violations 
of the defendant's equal protection rights. 100 It was not until Powers 
that the Court extended the right of the defendant to assert the equal 
protection claim of an excluded juror. 101 There are two problems with 
the Powers approach, however. First, the juror focus appears logically 
unsound. Second, the defendant's right to a fair trial is much more 
important than the juror's right to equal protection in the jury selection 
process. 
In its early decisions, the Supreme Court focused on the litigant's 
equal protection rights. In Strauder, the Court found that a statute 
allowing only white men to serve on juries violated a black man's equal 
protection rights. The Court explained: 
It is not easy to comprehend how it can be said that while every white 
man is entitled to a trial by a jury selected from persons of his own race 
or color, or, rather, selected without discrimination against his color, 
and a negro is not, the latter is equally protected by the law with the 
former. 102 
The reasoning seemed to be that because a white person had the right to 
have the possibility of having a white person on his or her jury that a 
black person should have the right to have the possibility of having a 
black person on his or her jury. 103 In Batson, the Court continued to 
emphasize the link between the race of the defendant and the race of the 
juror when it required that "the defendant . . . must show that he is a 
98. ld. at 218. 
99. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 633 (1991) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
100. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) ("The defendant first must show 
that he is a member of a cognizable racial group ... "); Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24 (denying 
an equal protection violation in a criminal case); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 
(1879) ("And how can it be maintained that compelling a colored man to submit to a trial for 
his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the State has expressly excluded every man 
of his race, because of color alone, however well qualified in other respects, is not a denial to 
him of equa11egal protection?"). 
101. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991). 
102. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309. 
103. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Cf Underwood, supra note 
82, at 733-36. 
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member of a cognizable group, and that the prosecutor has used 
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the 
defendant's race. "104 The Court suggested that if the litigant were not 
allowed a jury that could include members of his or her race while other 
litigants were allowed a jury that could include members of their race the 
fairness of a jury panel was suspect. 
Beginning in Powers, the Court allowed the litigant to assert the 
juror's claim of an equal protection violation on a theory of third party 
standing. 105 The Court claimed that barring the claim "because [the 
petitioner's] race differs from that of the excluded jurors would be to 
condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and 
privilege of jury service. "106 Subsequent to its decision in Powers, the 
Court extended the right to challenge race based peremptories to private 
litigants107 and criminal defendants. 108 In addition, the Court extend-
ed the prohibition to include sex-based peremptories109 based on the 
juror's equal protection rights. 
This recent shift in focus to the juror's equal protection rights 
contravenes the sound policy of the Court's earlier decisions. The earlier 
decisions focused on the litigant because allowing discrimination in the 
jury selection process undermines the litigant's perception of fairness. no 
It is difficult for a litigant to have faith in a process that excludes 
members of his or her race from participating in the jury. The Swain and 
Batson cases increased the litigant's perception of fairness by prohibiting 
jury practices that discriminate against the litigant based on his or her 
race.m Since historically the goal of the peremptory challenge was to 
increase the litigant's perception of fairness in jury selection, the equal 
protection analysis in those cases tended to restore the litigant's faith in 
the peremptory challenge system by eliminating unfair application of it 
against him or her. 
In the Powers analysis, however, the fairness of the peremptory 
system is not measured by how the litigant perceives the process but by 
104. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. 
105. Powers, 499 U.S. at 415. 
106. /d. 
107. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 614 (1991). 
108. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). 
109. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). 
110. See Edmonson, 500U.S. at633 (O'Connor,J., dissenting); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 87 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). 
Ill. In the Swain case, the Court argued that the use of the challenge was "being pervert-
ed" when used to discriminate against black jurors. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223. In Batson the 
Court stated, "Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's 
right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to 
secure." Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. 
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its effect on the juror. 112 Rather than strengthening the litigant's 
perception of fairness by invalidating procedures that discriminate against 
him or her, the equal protection clause is used to invalidate jury selection 
procedures that humiliate the excluded juror.113 Since peremptory 
challenges were not used to exclude jurors of the litigant's same race or 
sex, 114 the litigant's faith is not undermined significantly because the 
peremptory challenge has not been unfairly applied against him or 
her. 115 Although the juror does have an actionable claim if he is 
excluded from a jury because of his race, 116 the Court should not give 
a litigant standing to sue on behalf of the juror, because the litigant's 
perception of fairness has not been significantly diminished. Also, a 
juror's perception of unfairness is a very weak ground upon which to 
base standing. 
The Court's continued focus on the violation of the juror's equal 
protection rights has very serious consequences. By emphasizing the 
juror's equal protection rights, the Court has subordinated the right of the 
litigant to the right of the juror. For instance, since McCollum the Court 
has recognized the right of the state to object to the peremptory challeng-
es of a criminal defendant if they are racially motivated. 117 This 
decision protects a juror from being humiliated and becoming cynical 
about the fairness of the jury process while ignoring the defendant's right 
to exclude jurors that he feels will unfairly judge his case. 
There are two problems with the McCollum approach. The first 
problem is that the decision ignores the purpose of the peremptory 
challenge, which is to increase the litigant's perception of fairness.u8 
The second problem is that the juror's right to equal protection in jury 
selection is placed above the litigant's right to a fair trial. 119 Justice 
112. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414 (1991) ("The rejected juror may lose 
confidence in the court and its verdicts as may the defendant."). 
113. Seeid. 
114. Although the litigants in I.E. B. and Edmonson were members of the same excluded 
group, the Court focused on the juror's equal protection rights. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 
S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618-19. 
115. In fact, at times the litigant that is being challenged for his or her peremptory strikes 
is a criminal defendant who surely will not have an increase in faith about the fairness of the 
peremptory strike system if his or her challenges are the ones being held to violate the equal 
protection clause. See generally Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348,2348 (1992) (holding 
that a criminal defendant cannot exercise race based peremptory challenges). 
116. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970). 
117. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359 ("We hold that the Constitution prohibits a criminal 
defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges.") 
118. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). 
119. The juror also has standing to sue on his own behalf. See Caner, 396 U.S. 320. 
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Thomas explained the significant problems with such an approach when 
he wrote, "In effect, we have exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries 
over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, 
not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death. "120 By focusing 
on the juror, the Court has given greater weight to the right of the party 
with the least at stake in the trial process. 
The focus on the juror's right also makes the peremptory challenge 
unmanageable. By focusing on the juror's right, any party to a suit may 
make a claim of purposeful exclusion and force a race neutral explana-
tion.121 The number of Batson claims will consequently increase 
significantly. 122 Also, uncertainty about the permissible use of the 
peremptory challenge, may cause many litigants to refrain from 
exercising otherwise legitimate challenges because they fear protracted 
litigation over whether a juror's equal protection rights have been 
violated. Since litigants will not be able to exclude jurors whom they 
perceive to have a bias, they may lose faith in the fairness of the jury 
selection process. 123 This result is exactly what the peremptory was 
designed to avoid. 
C. Suggested Remedies to the Peremptory Problem 
In order to alleviate the problems that the recent peremptory 
challenge jurisprudence has created, the Court should return to a stricter 
application of Batson. It should require that a litigant124 show that he 
120. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
121. Since McCollum allows the state to protest exclusions that a criminal defendant 
makes, 112 S. Ct. at 2359, Edmonson allows civil litigants to make a claim, 500 U.S. at 628, 
Powers allows defendants who are not in the juror's cognizable group to make a claim on 
behalf of the excluded juror, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991), and J.E.B. extends 
the Batson protection to women, J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), a litigant could 
always contend that the exclusion of a juror was based on the juror's sex/race and demand a 
sex/race neutral explanation whether the litigant was the same sex/race or not. The 
consequence is that any party can always force race neutral or gender-neutral explanations 
because nothing but the group status of the juror is at issue. 
122. Since 1986, four Batson claims have reached the Supreme Court. Before that, 
peremptory challenge claims were relatively rare. Since the litigants can now claim third-party 
standing to sue on behalf of jurors, the amount of claims will probably increase significantly. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized this potential when it stated, "If the life of the law 
were logic rather than experience, Batson might well be extended to include religious bias and, 
for that matter, an endless number of other biases." State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 769 
(Minn. 1993). The United State Supreme Court has now extended the Batson protection to sex 
discrimination in peremptory challenges. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419. 
123. See supra part V.B.l. 
124. Because Edmonson applies Batson to civil litigants, a plaintiff or a defendant would 
be able to make a Batson challenge. Although the Court focused on the jurors' rights in 
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618-19, the plaintiff and the excluded jurors' were of the same race. 
The outcome of the case, therefore, would have arguably been the same if the Court had 
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is a member of a cognizable group, that the excluded juror is also a 
member of that group, and that other facts give rise to a presumption that 
the peremptory strike is based on that classification before the opposing 
litigant must give a group-neutral explanation. 125 By doing this, the 
litigant's equal protection rights are still protected. The Court can also 
safely extend the Batson prohibition of race based peremptory challenges 
to other suspect classifications, such as religion, because the standard for 
determining violations of equal protection will be more manageable. 126 
Although jurors' equal protection rights will not be safeguarded by the 
litigant, 127 this rule retains manageability and will maintain the viability 
of the peremptory challenge. If the Court continues to follow its recent 
cases, the peremptory challenge process will likely become hopelessly 
confused and unmanageable. 128 
If the Minnesota Supreme Court in Davis would have followed the 
Batson analysis its result would have been the same, but not because the 
religiously motivated peremptory challenge was less flagrant or common 
as the race based peremptory challenge. Since Davis was not of the same 
religion as the excluded juror, his argument would have failed the first 
tier of the Batson inquiry. The result would have been easier to reach 
and the classification of religiously motivated peremptory challenges as 
a more acceptable form of discrimination would have been avoided. 
If the Court continues to feel that the juror's equal protection rights 
are of predominant importance, the Court could simply eliminate 
peremptory challenges, because the juror's rights will probably be best 
protected by eliminating a process that fosters what the Court views as 
unsavory discrimination. 129 Complete elimination of peremptory 
challenges would better serve the Court's purpose of protecting juror's 
equal protection rights in the jury selection process and prevent the 
focused on the litigant's equal protection rights. The Ednwnson case also relies on theories of 
state action which are outside of the scope of this note. 
125. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). 
126. Since the only challengeable peremptory will be one which excludes a person who 
is included in the litigant's cognizable group, the number of Batson challenges will decrease. 
This also precludes the state in a criminal case from making a Batson challenge since the state 
has no group characteristics. In other words, the state does not have an identifiable race, 
religion, or sex. 
127. The juror could still have a claim; however, he or she would have to raise it. See 
Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Green County, 396 U.S. 320, 329-330 (1970). 
128. See supra part V.B.2. 
129. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 425 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('"[l]rrele-
vant' personal characteristics are by definition the basis for using [peremptory challenges] 
.... ");Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,220 (1965) ("It is no less frequently exercised on 
grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, 
religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations ofpeop1e summoned for jury duty."). 
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peremptory challenge jurisprudence from becoming confused and 
irrational. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court misapplied the United States Supreme 
Court equal protection analysis by not requiring religious neutral 
explanations to peremptory challenges. The necessary extension of the 
Powers analysis to the Davis case demonstrates the unworkability of the 
United States Supreme Court peremptory challenge jurisprudence. The 
Court's focus on jurors' equal protection rights ignores the purpose of 
peremptory challenges and places jurors' rights above defendants. 
Although one solution to the peremptory challenge would be to eliminate 
the peremptory challenge, a better approach would be a return to a 
stricter application of Batson by putting the focus of the equal protection 
analysis back on the litigant. Such an approach would maintain the 
litigant's equal protection rights while still maintaining the manageability 
of the peremptory challenge system. 
D. Scott Crook 
